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A two-step quantum key distribution protocol using frequency and polarization doubly entangled
photons is proposed. In this protocol, information is encoded by a unitary operation on each of the
two doubly entangled photons and sent from Alice to Bob in two steps. State measurement device
is designed. The security of the communication is analyzed.
Quantum communication, especially quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) is an important branch of quantum
information[1] which provides a secure way for creating
secret keys between the communication parties called Al-
ice and Bob. In the past few years, quantum key distri-
bution has progressed quickly[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14] since Bennett and Brassard presented the
BB84 QKD protocol [2]. Some QKD protocols are based
on the dense coding using Bell states [15]. One such
protocol is the two-step protocol in which the communi-
cation is realized in two steps [16, 17], it can not only
be used for QKD, but also for quantum secure direct
communication in which information is transmitted di-
rectly without using another classical communication of
the ciphered text [14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Meanwhile ex-
periments on quantum dense coding based on entangled
photon pairs and continuous variables have also been re-
ported in [22, 23, 24].
Entangled photon pairs have become a very important
resource for quantum communication. Experimentally
it is usually produced by using spontaneous parametric
down conversion (SPDC) [25], in which a nonlinear crys-
tal pumped by lasers to create two photons marked with
idler (i) and signal (s) respectively under the phase match
conditions: ωp = ωs + ωi, kp = ks + ki. These entan-
gled photons are usually the polarization entangled pho-
tons. Recently, Ravaro et al have experimentally demon-
strated the generation of frequency and polarization dou-
bly entangled photons (DEPs) using AlGaAs multi-layer
waveguide [26]. The high conversion efficiency of the
DEP pair has attracted much attention in recent years.
It is interesting to study the quantum communication
protocols based on them. In this paper, we present a se-
cure communication scheme based upon the polarization
and frequency DEPs. Because the DEP pairs possess an
additional degree of freedom in frequency, this protocol
also has the advantage of a higher capacity of coding.
DEP and its application was first introduced by Aolita
and Walborn [27]. Using nonlinear AlGaAs waveguide,
Ravaro et al. proposed a scheme theoretically of gener-
ating two counter propagating photons in the state:
|ent〉 = η1√|η1|2 + |η2|2
|ωs, H〉|ωi, V 〉
+
η2√
|η1|2 + |η2|2
|ωs′ , V 〉|ωi′ , H〉, (1)
where |H〉 (|V 〉) represents the horizontal polarization of
the electric(magnetic) field. If η1 = η2, the state becomes
frequency and polarization maximally double entangled
state.
Now we focus on the maximally entangled doubly en-
tangled states. First lets inspect the following state
Ψ+ab =
1√
2
(|H,ωs〉|V, ωi〉+ |V, ωs′〉|H,ωi′〉), (2)
as said before, H and V are polarizations of photons, ωs,
ωi, ωs′ , ωi′ are the frequencies of the signal and idler pho-
tons. Instead of producing entangled photons with fixed
frequencies in the polarization (singly) entangled pho-
ton state, doubly entangled photon pairs have two possi-
ble frequency combinations, namely it can either in state
with frequencies ωs and ωi, or with frequencies ωs′ and
ωi′ . Photon a is either in the state |H,ωs〉 or in |V, ωs′〉,
photon b is either in the state |H,ωi〉 or in |V, ωi′〉.
Local unitary operations acting on the two particles
transforms the state Ψ+ab to other eight bases shown below
Φ±ab =
1√
2
(|H,ωs〉|H,ωi〉 ± |V, ωs′〉|V, ωi′〉); (3)
Ψ±ab =
1√
2
(|H,ωs〉|V, ωi〉 ± |V, ωs′〉|H,ωi′〉); (4)
Γ±ab =
1√
2
(|V, ωs〉|H,ωi〉 ± |H,ωs′〉|V, ωi′〉); (5)
2Υ±ab =
1√
2
(|V, ωs〉|V, ωi〉 ± |H,ωs′〉|H,ωi′〉). (6)
The correspondence between unitary operation and
state is given in Table.I. As listed in the table, Ua ⊗ Ub
operation transforms state Ψ+ab to a unique state in the
basis set, and Alice and Bob agree that each state corre-
sponds to a 3-bit code word given in the table.
The two-step QKD protocol based on DEPs is de-
scribed in detail as follows.
Two-step Double-QKD protocol
(Step 1): Alice, the sender, prepares a series of DEP
pairs in Ψ+a,b. For each state, She makes a unitary oper-
ation on photon b. The operations are chosen from the
group {I, σx, σz , iσy}. This transforms state Ψ+a,b into
one of the state in {Φ±a,b,Ψ±a,b}. She then sends the b-
photon sequence [P1(b), P2(b), · · ·Pn(b)] to Bob.
(Step 2): Bob receives and saves the photons. Then
they perform a security check, the strategy will be dis-
cussed later.
(Step 3): Alice and Bob check Eve by public compari-
son. If the error rate is lower than a security bound, they
confirm that the first round communication is secure.
(Step 4): Alice encodes key information on the a pho-
tons using {I, σx, σz, iσy} operations. After that, she
sends the a photons sequence [P1(a), P2(a), · · ·Pn(a)] to
Bob.
(Step 5):Bob receives the photons and makes joint
measurement to distinguish the eight different states.
Next we focus on the devices for state measurement.
The measurement device is shown in Fig.1. When a
DEP enters Bob’s measurement device, one to the left
wavelength-division multiplexing device(WDM) and the
other to the right, photons with different frequencies can
be distinguished. The two photons leave the port of each
WDM in either the ωs/ωi port or the ωs′/ωi′ port.
Then, each photon passes through a polarizing beam
splitter and enters a device shown in Fig.2 being detected
by one of the two detectors at each port. Table II gives
the correspondence between the ports at which detectors
triggered and the states. Here there is still a two-fold
degeneracy, and it is further distinguished by the two
detectors at each port.
At each port, we place a wavelength converter and
make a σx measurement as shown in Fig.2.
In the measurement for example, at time t the detec-
tors on port 1 and port 4 triggers, Bob knows the state
are Ψ±, triggers on port 3, 2 indicates Γ± and so on.
Then passing the two photons to wavelength converter
[28]. Then the state degenerates to Bell state: Ψ±Bell =
1√
2
(|HV 〉 ± |V H〉). Following a quarter wave plate Bob
transforms the H,V bases to |+ x〉 = |H〉+ |V 〉, | − x〉 =
|H〉− |V 〉 bases. In this way, the states Ψ± can be trans-
formed to |+x〉|+x〉−|−x〉|−x〉 and |+x〉|−x〉−|−x〉|+x〉.
Bob performs a σx ⊗ σx measurement and distinguishes
the state completely since the polarizations are either
parallel or antiparallel. The other three bases can also
be distinguished. In this way, the eight states can be
completely distinguished.
There are two security checking strategies in our
scheme, one is “decoy state” strategy and the other is
wavelength convertor strategy.
The “decoy state” scheme uses single photons. When
the communication starts, Alice inserts single photons
with frequency ωi or ωi′ and polarization state |H〉, |V 〉,
|H + V 〉, |H − V 〉 randomly in the b photon series as
“decoy state” photons. After Bob receives the photons,
Alice announces the positions of the single photons pub-
licly. Bob chooses to measure them either in the σz or the
σx bases. Bob then declares the bases and Alice checks
which bases they match. If they happen to choose the
same bases, their results are in agreement. If there are
eavesdropping, there will be error. Thus after compari-
son, if the error rate is lower than a security bound, they
confirm that the communication is secure. Otherwise
they drop the data and restart the communication.
In the wavelength convertor strategy, after Bob re-
ceives b photons from Alice, he chooses some photons ran-
domly and performs a wavelength conversion. He then
announces the positions of photons to Alice. Alice per-
forms the same operation. The wavelength of ωs, ωs′ and
ωi, ωi′ turn to ωs0 = min(ωs, ωs′), ωi0 = min(ωi, ωi′)
respectively. In this way, the DEPs degenerate to Bell
states:
|Φ±Bell〉 =
1√
2
(|HH〉 ± |V V 〉);
|Ψ±Bell〉 =
1√
2
(|HV 〉 ± |V H〉). (7)
They both choose to measure the photons in either σz or
σx bases, and announce the bases so as to pick up the
matched particles. Finally they compare the results and
check the error rate to confirm the security.
In the following we will analyze the security of the pro-
tocol under the intercept-resend(IR) attack. Eve hides
herself in the communication channel and intercepts the
”b” photons and measures them, and then prepares a
series of photons according to her measurement, and re-
sends them to Bob. Because the interception destroys
the entanglement between the a and b photons, Alice
and Bob may discover the eavesdropping in the second
security checking method. Also this IR attack will intro-
duce 25% of errors on the “decoy state” photons, so it
is easily to be discovered by the first security checking
method.
In conclusion, we have proposed a two-step QKD pro-
tocol using DEPs. The measurement device in distin-
guishing the eight states is designed. We also made an
analysis on its security. Since the DEPs has a higher gen-
eration efficiency, it maybe an alternative entanglement
source for communication.
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4TABLE I: The correspondence between unitary operations
and states
key operation state key operation state
000 I ⊗ I Ψ+ 100 σx ⊗ I Υ
+
001 I ⊗ σz Ψ
− 101 σx ⊗ σz Υ
−
010 I ⊗ σx Φ
+ 110 σx ⊗ σx Γ
+
011 I ⊗ iσy Φ
− 111 σx ⊗ iσy Γ
−
000 σz ⊗ I Ψ
− 100 iσy ⊗ I Υ
−
001 σz ⊗ σz Ψ
+ 101 iσy ⊗ σz Υ
+
010 σz ⊗ σx Φ
− 110 iσy ⊗ σx Γ
−
011 σz ⊗ iσy Φ
+ 111 iσy ⊗ iσy Γ
+
TABLE II: The correspondence between ports in Bell state
measurement device and states
Triggered Port Corresponding states
1,2 Φ±
1,4 Ψ±
3,2 Γ±
3,4 Υ±
PBS
WDM
WDM
WDM
WDM
PBS
Entangled
pair
1 2
3 4
s
s'
i
i'
FIG. 1: Bell state measurement device.
wavelength
converter
QWP PBS+
Detector -
Detector +
FIG. 2: Xˆ bases measurement device. Here QWP is the
quarter wave plate and PBS+ is the σx basis polarizing beam
splitter.
